



The National Counterterrorism Agency's Efforts to Improve Intelligence Institution Collaboration in Countering Terrorism in Indonesia

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Article History:

Submitted:
2024-08-28

Accepted:
2024-09-24

Published:
2024-10-16

Abstract

Lack of intelligence collaboration is considered to be one of the fundamental problems in tackling terrorism in Indonesia. However, amidst the negative attention, there are efforts by BNPT (National Counterterrorism Agency) to improve collaboration between intelligence agencies. By using Weiss's theory to analyze various statements from public officials and state institutions regarding the issue of intelligence agency cooperation in Indonesia, this paper finds two important conclusions. First, efforts to encourage the formation of intelligence collaboration have actually been carried out by BNPT by equalizing perceptions among various intelligence agencies in viewing the problems and issues of terrorism. This is evidenced by a series of training conducted by BNPT in the period 2020-2023 which aims to encourage synergy between intelligence agencies related to terrorism issues. Second,

still in line with what Weiss revealed, BNPT's steps with this series of training are inseparable from the external pressure sourced from public opinion in encouraging the formation of cooperation. In this case, the strong public demand for the importance of intelligence collaboration in dealing with the problem of terrorism is inseparable from the intensity of terrorism attacks that occurred from 2016 to 2021. The bomb attacks that occurred during this period led to polemics over the function of intelligence, which in turn shows the importance of intelligence collaboration as an important component of counterterrorism.

Keywords: Intelligence collaboration, Common perception, External pressure, Intelligence training.

Introduction

From 2020 to 2023, it is recorded that the BNPT (National Counter-Terrorism Agency) has carried out several trainings for various intelligence agents spread across several government agencies involved in handling terrorism. Apart from the resulting effectiveness, this series of training needs to be seen as an important step in encouraging increased collaboration between various existing intelligence agencies. In the context of legal reform, BNPT's positive steps are also inseparable from changes to the terrorism law which indirectly encourage strengthening the institutional role of BNPT in the field of terrorism prevention intelligence.

For example, since 2018 a collaborative group between ministries/institutions has been formed to play a role in reducing the spread of intolerant radicalism. BNPT formed a synergistic team that collaborated with 46 ministries/institutions and formed working groups and sub-working groups whose members consisted of TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/the Indonesian National Armed Forces), ASN (Aparat Sipil Negara/State Civil Apparatus) and POLRI (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia/the Indonesian National Police). BNPT preventive intelligence operations are carried out by the Prevention Working Group which was formed in 2012. Implementing the activities are BNPT personnel and TNI BKO (Under Operational Control of the Indonesian National

Armed Forces) personnel, each of whom carries out their duties in accordance with their respective procedures.¹

Since its inception in 2010, BNPT was intended to tackle terrorism by forming a task force that included elements of the POLRI and TNI in BNPT which was prepared under operational control. The Task Force has the task of carrying out counter-terrorism in the areas of prevention, protection, de-radicalization, prosecution and preparation of national preparedness. This means that elements of the POLRI and TNI can not only be involved in counter-terrorism tasks, such as freeing hostages, freeing plane hijackers, or sporadic and simultaneous armed attacks, but also other tasks, especially related to intelligence.

Despite this mandate, BNPT's challenge in synergizing these two institutions and other institutions related to the terrorism intelligence aspect is not easy. The biggest question that arises is what strategy BNPT has in coordinating and strengthening intelligence from the POLRI and TNI which are under BNPT to tackle terrorism. In addition, BNPT basically does not have operating standards for the POLRI and TNI in carrying out their duties at BNPT. Not only does it encourage synergy between the two institutions, collaborating with key intelligence agencies such as BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara/the State Intelligence Agency) in handling terrorism is also in the spotlight. That is the challenge for BNPT, namely coordinating and strengthening intelligence units, whether TNI, POLRI or BIN, effectively in countering terrorism. It is very important to strengthen intelligence within the BNPT considering the function of this institution as a leading sector in counter-terrorism issues.

In the midst of quite high institutional demands in forming effective intelligence collaboration, various bomb attacks that occurred in the last decade have indirectly contributed to complicating these collaboration efforts. This indirectly shows that there is a *gap* between the expected collaborative efforts and the obstacles that occur. In recent times, there have been several bomb attacks which have attracted the public's attention, such as the Sarinah Bomb which occurred in 2016, the Surabaya Bomb attack which occurred in 2018, and the Cathedral Bomb attack in Makassar in 2021. This series of events

¹ Indonesian National Armed Forces. (2022, April 1). *Sinergitas TNI - BNPT Dalam Penanggulangan Terorisme*. [TNI - BNPT Synergy in Countering Terrorism.] Accessed February 10, 2024, from <https://majalah.tni.mil.id/newspaper/118/sinergitas-tni-bnpt-dalam-penanggulangan-terorisme.html>

ultimately gave rise to pessimism regarding the seriousness of the government or in this case the BNPT to encourage the creation of intelligence collaboration in handling terrorism.

The weakness of intelligence coordination in countering terrorism has actually become a highlight in the area of academic study. Wahyudi and Syauqillah in their journal article stated that the complexity of intelligence institutions in Indonesia is quite an inhibiting factor in creating effective collaboration between various existing intelligence institutions.²In the case of countering terrorism, both of them highlight the weak effectiveness that has been developed due to the imbalance in the role of existing institutions. POLRI is considered to still be the dominant institution at a time when the role of other institutions outside POLRI is still considered minimal. The research results also show that in an effort to realize synergy between intelligence agencies, it is necessary to develop permanent procedures, carry out joint terror countermeasures exercises, and other activities that support the common perception of members of each agency and eliminate egocentric attitudes and rivalry.

The weak synergy between various intelligence agencies was also highlighted by a journal article written by Huda entitled *The Role of Intelligence in Law Enforcement for Combating Terrorism Cases in Indonesia*.³The author states that despite the strong role of the intelligence agency, namely BIN, in carrying out counter-terrorism in several cases of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, the synergy that has been built between intelligence agencies is still quite weak. In fact, effectiveness in counter-terrorism can be increased if coordination with other institutions can be carried out more optimally.

One of the efforts to form synergy between various intelligence agencies in Indonesia is the issuance of a revised anti-terrorism law in 2018. With the issuance of this law, it is hoped that it will increase synergy between existing institutions. This is of course a special concern considering that before the issuance of the revised Anti-Terrorism Law in 2018, implementation of Operations Counter terrorism intelligence carried out by BIN and Law Enforcement Operations

² I., Wahyudi, R., & Syauqillah, M. (2022). Strengthening Cooperation among Intelligence Agencies in the Enforcement of Law on Terrorism: The Case of Indonesia. *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* Vol. 12 , no. 1. <https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/jispo/index>

³ Huda, Achmad Zainal., Ghafur, Hanief Saha., Syauqillah, Muhammad., & Khusna, Widhyahrini . (2023). The Role of Intelligence in Law Enforcement for Combating Terrorism Cases in Indonesia. *Pena Justisia: Vol.22 , No.02*. <https://jurnal.unikal.ac.id/index.php/hk/article/view/3184/pdf23>

carried out by the POLRI tend to be carried out individually in the context of independent rather than joint operations.

Another research journal that highlights the issue of coordination between intelligence agencies in Indonesia is also touched on in an article entitled *The Role of Effective and Efficient Coordination between Intelligence Agencies*.⁴ The article states that effective coordination between intelligence agencies in Indonesia has not been achieved because the existing basic policy for implementing coordination (legal basis) is felt to be still limited to coordination between the POLRI and TNI intelligence agencies. In his writing, he also highlighted the weak coordinating role of BIN, which should be able to play a central role in coordinating various existing intelligence agencies. The weak coordination role played by BIN has an impact on differences in operational standards set by each intelligence agency which operate separately. Even though facing the challenge of global security threats, BIN's coordination function must be improved as quickly as possible.

Apart from these three studies, the article written by Suharmono also highlights the weak cooperation that exists between various intelligence agencies in countering terrorism.⁵ Collaboration between stakeholders among various intelligence agencies has not been effective, especially in building effective communication. Effective communication is absolutely necessary to create a collective analysis of information. The pattern of coordination that occurs between various intelligence agencies is limited to *sharing sessions* without a joint analysis process so that they cannot produce a comprehensive analysis of an issue.

Not only that, the article also highlights the issue of sectoral ego which is still very high in each existing intelligence agency. According to him, there is a tendency for each organization to maintain limited information circulation within their institutions so that intelligence information is not properly synchronized. If this information is synergized, it will be beneficial for the success of intelligence. Countering terrorism will be more optimal. All agencies

⁴ Sunarko, MR, Muluk, K., & Hariyono, BS (2021). The Role of Effective and Efficient Coordination between Intelligence Agencies. *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change*. www.ijicc.net Vol. 13 , No. 1. https://www.ijicc.net/images/vol_13/13113_Sunarko_2020_E_R.pdf

⁵ Suharmono, Munip., Akim, & Sudirman, Arfin. (2019). TNI Intelligence's Role on Preventing Global Terrorism Threat in Indonesia. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 13, no. 4. https://www.cejiss.org/images/issue_articles/2019-volume-13-issue-4/04-tni-intelligence-s-role-on-preventing-global-terrorism-threat-in-indonesia.pdf

have detailed information and detailed and specific information, if they can put it all together.

The issue of sectoral ego between intelligence agencies was also highlighted by Mahyudin in his article.⁶ In his writing he stated that in practice, Indonesian intelligence activities tend not to be well coordinated between one institution and another due to three important things. First, there is a trust deficit between fellow state intelligence agencies. Second, the weak role of BIN in encouraging information sharing between existing intelligence agencies. If we refer to legal rules, BIN basically has the authority to force intelligence agencies under its coordination to carry out information sharing. However, this authority is difficult to implement effectively amidst the strong ego of intelligence institutions in Indonesia.

Based on the literature review that has been presented, the author sees that the research that has been carried out tends to show findings and conclusions that lead to weak intelligence cooperation in countering terrorism. In contrast to this view, the author in this article focuses on viewing and analyzing the efforts that have been made to encourage the creation of intelligence collaboration. The author sees that regardless of the debate about whether these efforts are effective or not, BNPT's steps in encouraging intelligence collaboration is a fact that must be studied further. Based on this, the author asks the following question, ***“How are BNPT's efforts to encourage intelligence collaboration in countering terrorism?”***

To explore how intelligence collaboration under BNPT is pursued, this paper uses Janet Weiss's concept regarding the “Process Model of Cooperation” between various institutions in a country.⁷ The conceptual framework offered by Weiss is used to identify factors that encourage increased collaboration between institutions. Weiss stated that there are four factors in encouraging the creation of collaboration, namely external forces, common problems, resources and capacity. These four items are used as a guide to highlight and identify relevant variables that are considered important for encouraging inter-agency collaboration.

⁶ Mahyudin, E. (2016). An Overview upon the Challenge of Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia. *Intermestic: Journal of International Studies*, 1 (1), 23–35. <https://doi.org/10.24198/intermestic.v1n1.3>

⁷ Weiss, Janet A. Pathways to Cooperation Among Public Agencies. (1987). *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 7, no. 1.

Regarding efforts to analyze cooperation between intelligence agencies, the author sees that the definition of cooperation put forward by Weiss is quite close to the issues raised. In her theory, she said that inter-institutional cooperation will occur when two or more organizations that have the same problem area agree to handle the problem by building relationships through formal contacts in providing resources and adjusting internal or external procedures to support a new arrangement or a new efforts adequately.

Even in political systems in well-established countries, the responsibilities of the authorities in a matter actually still overlap. Therefore, a certain amount of cooperation must already exist. Therefore, the development and implementation of public policy often requires multilateral cooperation that blurs or eliminates traditional boundaries or jurisdictions. However, differences in organizational goals and operational routines can make things difficult and, therefore, a more formal and coordinated collaboration process is needed .

The model proposed by Weiss basically explains that existing institutions must undergo a three-step process which is preceded by external influences. These three process steps are the driving force in generating the cooperation needed to achieve maximum implementation of an initiative. The steps in this process include three things. First, unify perceptions so that the problems faced can be perceived objectively across all institutions. Second, provide resources to be able to handle problems cooperatively. Third, strengthening institutional capacity to foster cooperation.

Based on the conceptual reference that the author uses, the assumption built in this research is that the BNPT's steps in encouraging intelligence collaboration are carried out by seeking to form a common perception between various intelligence agencies in looking at the issue of terrorism. A series of training carried out by BNPT in the 2020-2023 period is an effort to build a common perception between various intelligence agencies related to terrorism issues. Apart from that, through the concept put forward by Weiss, BNPT's steps in building a common perception between intelligence agencies are also inseparable from public pressure on the importance of intelligence collaboration in handling terrorism in Indonesia.

METHOD

This research uses a qualitative approach which is descriptive analysis using content data analysis techniques. The content in question includes written and spoken documents reported in the press media, especially on online news media channels. Not only that, news content which originate from questions from public officials attached to the institution's official website are also material for analysis of the content in question. The data content analyzed includes statements from relevant agency officials explaining the functions of BNPT training in improving intelligence coordination. Apart from that, statements made by politicians, public officials and non-governmental organizations regarding their demands for increased intelligence coordination are also part of the data content analyzed.

As for data collection techniques, this research uses document-based techniques or library studies to collect primary data originating from official state documents and news issued by national news agencies or similar on several social media platforms as explained.⁸ The procedure used for recording and reducing data as a component in content analysis is carried out by sorting all news that contains keywords; intelligence coordination, the role of BNPT, intelligence mistakes, and intelligence synergy in overcoming terrorism in Indonesia. The data that has been collected will be analyzed based on the narrative construction offered by the concept of institutional collaboration proposed by Weiss.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Efforts to Equalize Perceptions as BNPT's Efforts to Encourage Collaboration between Intelligence Agents in Countering Terrorism

Weiss in her theory states that steps in equalizing perceptions between various institutions are the first step in encouraging collaboration. Referring to this, the author sees that in recent times, BNPT as one of the main components in dealing with terrorism issues in Indonesia has attempted to form a common perception in looking at terrorism issues, especially in equalizing perceptions between intelligence agents owned by each institution involved in dealing with

⁸ Krippendorff, Klaus. (2004). *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology*. Sage Publication, California.

terrorism. This article sees that in the 2020-2023 period there was an increase in efforts made by BNPT to form this common perception.

In 2020, for example, BNPT, through the Directorate of Capacity Development, held friendly activities between state intelligence agencies from the TNI - POLRI, BIN, BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis/Strategic Intelligence Agency), BIK (Badan Intelijen Keamanan/Police Intelligence Agency), and the BNPT Task Force. Taking place at a hotel in Jakarta, the event, which was held in the first week of August 2020, was attended by 78 participants. The participants, who came from various elements of state intelligence, had previously been given field practice. At the peak event, each participant was then given time to explain and discuss the results of their findings during field practice in the discussion forum.

The main aim of the meeting and training was to support the creation of a common perception, which was clearly emphasized by Budiono Sandi. He stated firmly that the aim of the event was to increase the ability of state intelligence agents to implement “knowledge sharing” and “information sharing” with each other. According to Sandi, this is very important to be able to achieve a unified perception and interpretation regarding various actual Intelligence problems related to *modus operandi* and countering terrorism.

This common perception is the basic key when each existing state intelligence agent carries out intelligence roles and functions in each component and unit. He stated that synergy is a fundamental aspect so that it is necessary to intensify communication with each of the main intelligence agencies in the *cyber domain* which is now also being exploited by terrorist groups in building their networks.

Strengthening the function of BNPT in encouraging the same perception among intelligence agencies is very important. If we refer to Weiss' stages, equalizing perceptions is the main factor in increasing cooperation and collaboration. In this case, BNPT plays a fairly central role in encouraging the creation of communication, a sense of trust and a willingness to cooperate between intelligence agencies which tend to still be divided by high sectoral egos. The friendship and coordination forum carried out by BNPT is important as the first step in building an embryonic sense of trust and willingness to cooperate among intelligence agents in Indonesia. Moreover, facing a situation

where various existing intelligence agencies have different ways of working and authority in dealing with terrorism.

Apart from that, in 2022, BNPT's efforts to create a common perception among various intelligence agents will also be carried out with sharpen intelligence guidelines by holding intelligence training for government officials in the context of countering terrorism. BNPT stated that the training was an internal part bringing together perceptions, information and data in the context of efforts to prevent criminal acts of terrorism. The training was recorded as being attended by 70 participants consisting of BIN, the Indonesian Air Force Security and Code Service, the Indonesian Navy Security and Code Service, the Indonesian National Police Intelligence and Security Agency, Attorney General's Office, the Indonesian Navy Headquarters, Metro Jaya Regional Police, FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighters) Task Force, Densus 88 (Densus 88 Antiterrorist Squad of the Indonesian National Police), Intel Korbrimob (Mobile Brigade Corps Intelligence), Customs and Immigration.⁹

By encouraging the creation of standard guidelines for coordination between intelligence units, BNPT seeks to increase the role of existing intelligence in each institution so that it can carry out its role as an early warning and early detection system for all forms of terrorist threats. Apart from that, through this activity, BNPT also emphasized that equalizing perceptions is very important to also see the shortcomings and weaknesses of the intelligence functions that have been carried out in each institution so that sharp and accurate intelligence products regarding the threat of terrorism can be created.

Not only in the national context, BNPT's efforts to encourage the creation of intelligence cooperation in countering terrorism are also actively carried out by strengthening coordination between various intelligence agencies at regional and local levels. In 2023, for example, BNPT will conduct intelligence training involving a number of institutions, with a total of 70 participants taking part, consisting of East Java Regional Police Intelligence Unit, East Java Regional Police Intelligence Unit, Surabaya Police Intelligence Unit, East Java Police Intelligence Unit, Brawijaya V Regional Military Command, Muljono

⁹ BNPT. (2022, October 4). *Pertajam Pedoman Koordinasi Agen Intelijen Dalam Pencegahan Terorisme, BNPT RI Adakan Pelatihan Intelijen Bagi Aparatur Pemerintah.* [Sharpening Guidelines for Coordinating Intelligence Agents in Preventing Terrorism, BNPT RI Holds Intelligence Training for Government Apparatus.] Accessed on February 10, 2024, from <https://www.bnpt.go.id/pertajam-pedoman-koordinat-agen-intelijen-dalam-pengcepatan-terorisme-bnpt-ri-adakan-bisnis-intelijen-bagi-aparatur-government>

Air Base, Surabaya V Lantamal Denintel, Surabaya Special Class I Immigration, Tanjung Perak Surabaya Customs and Excise, Tanjung Perak Surabaya District Prosecutor's Office, East Java Province Bakesbangpol and FTF Regional Task Force.

Quoting from its website, BNPT stated that the activities in East Java were the agency's commitment to increase insight for intelligence agents. BNPT also added that this event was also a basis for the formation of a solid pattern of integration and collaboration, especially between intelligence officers in the East Java region in efforts to overcome terrorism that was developing in East Java. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the integration of each intelligence unit in the East Java region is a vital aspect in carrying out the role of intelligence as an early warning and early detection of all forms of terrorist threats. This cannot be achieved without improving the quality of communication, coordination and also synergy in exchanging data between intelligence agents to produce comprehensive intelligence products, so that decision making is more precise and focused.

Referring to what Weiss conveyed in her theory, the three examples of activities described illustrate how BNPT seeks to build a common perception among various intelligence agencies in countering terrorism. This is of course an important step as well as a foundation for intensifying the coordination formed in these joint trainings to then build a more standard and systematic information sharing system. Even though it has not yet achieved higher goals, it is hoped that these efforts will at least be able to dissolve the divisions that have been built up between the various intelligence agents in the institutions involved in handling terrorism.

Public Pressure to Encourage BNPT's Efforts to Increase Intelligence Cooperation

If we look more deeply, BNPT's efforts to improve coordination between various intelligence agencies in handling terrorism cannot be separated from several important events that occurred in previously. Several terrorist attacks, especially those that occurred from 2016 to 2021, have strengthened public pressure in demanding increased collaboration between various intelligence agencies in resolving terrorism issues. Weiss (1987) argues that cooperation

between institutions is most likely to occur when there are external influences that force these institutions to collaborate, coordinate, and ultimately work together.

Weiss explains that these external influences can be random or systematic. She categorizes the systematic influences in encouraging this collaboration as including, among others, the existence of a legislative mandate, the emergence of internal organizational issues, and the existence of community demands. Referring to Weiss's view, the author sees that the series of terrorist attacks that occurred in the 2016-2021 period basically increased public demands for increasing the function of intelligence in preventing terrorism. One of the main criticisms from the public is highlighting the problem of weak coordination between the various existing intelligence agencies. This is where the author sees that community sentiment and demands become an "external pressure" in encouraging concrete efforts to collaborate between various intelligence agencies in dealing with terrorism.

Public criticism of the weak collaboration between various intelligence agencies stems from the division of authority to handle terrorism itself among several existing agencies. Basically, since it was formed in 2010, BNPT is an institution that is expected to play a role in harmonizing various intelligence tools spread across several existing institutions in countering terrorism. One of the institutions that is quite dominant in this regard is Densus 88. Institutionally, Densus 88 is the institution that has the most adequate resources and instruments in preventing acts of terrorism. One of the supporting instruments for Densus' performance is its intelligence function in absorbing information related to suspected terrorist movements that lead to acts of violence.

With its authority to take action, the intelligence function of Densus 88 becomes very central. This tends to make Densus' internal intelligence information the main source of information for the agency in carrying out prevention and action. While the authority of other intelligence agencies is limited to collecting intelligence data, Densus can move tactically to follow up on the internal intelligence data it collects to move tactically to follow up on its findings. When internal intelligence information becomes the main and primary source for Densus in carrying out preventive actions, intelligence data information provided and provided by other intelligence agencies tends to become secondary data that is not utilized optimally. This tendency certainly

has an impact on the effectiveness of early detection of terrorist movements that lead to violence.

The Sarinah Bombing case in 2016 is a real illustration of this problem. In this case, the head of BIN at that time, Sutiyoso, voiced that his agency should also be given enforcement authority. He stated in an interview with *Kompas* media that often the information provided by BIN was not followed up by the POLRI.¹⁰ This is due to the limitations of the POLRI who are tasked with carrying out arrests and detentions. Sometimes the intelligence evidence found by BIN does not have sufficient evidence to state that the suspicious activity leads to violent acts of terrorism. For example, when BIN found indications of terrorist training activities and then conveyed this to the police, it could not be followed up because the evidence was insufficient.

The Sarinah bomb in 2016 actually strengthened the polemic in society related to the effectiveness of intelligence institutions and the impact it has on the sustainability of democratic values because it is considered to violate the human rights of citizens. Sutiyoso's request at that time to increase BIN's authority immediately met resistance from various components of society. One of the institutions that was quite strict in responding to this request was KontraS (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan/Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence). KontraS very firmly rejects giving enforcement authority to BIN because it has the potential for serious human rights violations. In one of its questions, this institution saw that BIN's failure to anticipate the threat of terrorism was not due to the lack of enforcement authority but because of the still weak performance of BIN itself. In addition, a case such as the Sarinah bomb attack cannot be used as an excuse to increase the function of this authority.¹¹

Not only from KontraS, but strong criticism also came from other elements of society. Another NGO that criticized the additional authority for BIN to take action against suspected terrorists came from Imparsial (the Indonesian Human

¹⁰ Prabowo, Dani. (2016, January 15). *Sutiyoso Usul BIN Diberi Wewenang Penangkapan dan Penahanan*. [Sutiyoso suggests that BIN be given the authority to arrest and detain.] Accessed February 10, 2024, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/01/15/18253041/Sutiyoso.Usul.BIN.Diberi.Weauthor.Penangkapan.dan.Penahanan>

¹¹ Kusuma, Edward Febriyatri. (2016, January 17). *Kontras Tak Setuju BIN Diberi Kewenangan Penindakan*. [Kontras Disagrees with BIN being Given Enforcement Authority.] Accessed on February 10, 2024, from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3120157/kontras-tak-setuju-bin-diberi-kewerahan-penindakan>

Rights Monitor). The agency stated that the intelligence failure in the Sarinah Bomb case was more due to a lack of collaboration between existing intelligence agents. Imparsial states that what BIN needs more now is improvement and increased coordination with other state institutions in dealing with terrorism, such as the Police and BNPT.¹² Not only coordination, BIN officials also need to improve intelligence capabilities related to budget support, quality of sources human resources, intelligence technology, intelligence education, intelligence recruitment and others. Increasing capacity is absolutely necessary considering that BIN is an institution tasked with carrying out early detection by collecting information and analyzing information accurately.

If explored further, the polemic that occurred in 2016 strengthened the public spotlight on the existence of a *trust* deficit between intelligence agencies caused by a lack of coordination between them. The lack of *trust* between intelligence agencies can be seen clearly from Sutiyoso's statement as head of BIN at that time who complained that BIN information was often not followed up by the Police or in this case Densus 88. The issue of *trust* between institutions which is still very minimal at a certain level also indirectly illustrates there is quite a strong institutional conflict between various intelligence agencies in Indonesia. Sutiyoso in several interviews with the media or several working meetings with the DPR RI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia/the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) complained that his agency was often blamed when terrorist attacks occurred even though BIN had repeatedly given early warnings to the police about the possibility of terrorist attacks even though the time and place could not be confirmed with certainty.

In developing public opinion, BIN is an institution that is often scapegoated for terror incidents that occur in Indonesia. In the terror incident in 2018, for example, public sentiment towards BIN's weak performance was quite strong. With the bomb incident in Surabaya, various criticisms poured in because BIN was seen as always failing to anticipate a number of terror attacks that occurred. The narrative of "missed" is always a word that emerges in assessing BIN's weak

¹² Erdianto, Kristian. (2016, March 3). [*Imparsial: BIN Tinggal Minta Info dari Polisi, Tak Perlu Interogasi.*] *Impartial: BIN Just Asks for Information from the Police, No Need for Interrogation.* Retrieved February 10, 2024, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/03/01/09553831/Imparsial.BIN.Tinggal.Minta.Info.dari.Polisi.Tak.Need.Interrogation>

performance.¹³ Responding to public pressure on the narrative of failure that developed with the series of terror events that occurred, a number of public figures attempted to neutralize this with various statements made in defense of BIN.

The presidential chief of staff and minister of home affairs at that time emphasized that the tragedy of the Surabaya bombing in 2018 did not necessarily show that BIN had missed out. Moeldoko emphasized that true acts of terror can only be detected without knowing exactly when they happened.¹⁴ In a follow-up statement, the presidential chief of staff argued that the terror perpetrators in Surabaya used new methods which made it difficult to detect when an attack occurred.¹⁵

Tjahjo Kumolo, for example, denied public opinion that BIN had failed by stating that even the greatest country like the United States could not avoid the WTC attacks.¹⁶ Not only that, Jusuf Kalla as vice president stated that BIN had actually carried out its duties by providing warnings about possible terrorist attacks between December and January.¹⁷ The counter-narrative that has emerged is that what the public is questioning as “intelligence leaks” is basically intelligence analysis that is not yet detailed and has not touched down to the group or location of the attack, not the absence of intelligence efforts at all.

Even though criticism of BIN is quite dominant, the growing public reaction and pressure actually points strongly to the issue of weak coordination between

¹³ Gatra, Sandro. (2018, May 19). *Setiap Ada Bom, Publik Buru-buru Bilang Intelijen Kecolongan*. [Every time there is a bomb, the public rushes to say that intelligence missed it.] Accessed February 10, 2024, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/19/21322451/cepat-ada-bom-publik-buru-buru-bilang-intelijen-kecolongan>

¹⁴ Ihsanuddin. (2018, May 16). *Moeldoko: BIN Tidak Kecolongan*. [Moeldoko: BIN Was Not Missed.] Accessed February 10, 2024, from <https://pemilu.kompas.com/read/2018/05/16/14431851/moeldoko-bin-tidak-kecolongan>

¹⁵ Amirullah. (2018, May 16). *Bantah BIN Kecolongan, Moeldoko: Teroris Gunakan Metode Baru*. [Denies that BIN missed out, Moeldoko: Terrorists Use New Methods.] Retrieved February 10, 2014, from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1089621/bantah-bin-kecolongan-moeldoko-teroris-using-method-baru>

¹⁶ Nadlir, Moh., & Asril, Sabrina. (2018, May 15). *Soal Rentetan Aksi Terorisme, Mendagri Sebut Amerika Serikat Pun Bisa Kecolongan*. [Regarding the series of acts of terrorism, the Minister of Home Affairs said that even the United States could miss out.] Retrieved February 10, 2024, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/15/00483321/soal-rentetan-aksi-terorisme-mendagri-buat-amerika-serikat-pun-bisa>

¹⁷ Saputri, Dessy Suciati. (2016, January 14). *Bom Sarinah, JK Bantah BIN Kecolongan*. [Sarinah Bomb, JK Denies BIN Missed.] Accessed February 10, 2024, from <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/o0xqlb384/bom-sarinah-jk-bantah-bin-kecolongan>

various state institutions in preventing terrorism. The polemic that arose in line with BIN's request to be given an enforcement mandate also clarified the problem of weak coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Weak cooperation is ultimately considered an essential problem in overcoming terrorism in society. This is indicated by the many views coming from experts who consider that coordination between various government institutions is the real root of the problem in dealing with terrorism.

One of the narratives that is developing is that if BIN has basically predicted down to the group level and location of the attack, but there has been no follow-up from law enforcement officials, the problem does not lie in a lack of authority, but rather in a lack of coordination between security forces, especially between agents. intelligence that exists in each institution. This demand for strengthening coordination is a public effort to ward off the desire to expand the powers of arrest for intelligence. The problem of coordination has become a narrative that is used as a solution because adding authority to intelligence agencies or BIN does not actually solve the problem, but further complicates the problem.

This pressure to strengthen coordination was then articulated more vocally in various statements from various politicians sitting in the DPR RI. In a statement published in *Detik* media, Member of Commission III DPR RI, Aboe Bakar Alhabsyi, said the government needed to increase synergy and coordination between various state intelligence agencies. He stated that the bomb attack on the church in 2018 was a strong warning that early detection and rapid prevention are the keys to handling terrorism in Indonesia which can only be achieved with synergy between various state institutions such as the POLRI, TNI, BNPT and BIN.¹⁸

Not only does it highlight the importance of coordination between various institutions in handling terrorism, the demands that occur also target strengthening the intelligence function itself as the main component in resolving terrorism. Mardani Ali Sera as Deputy Chairman of Commission II DPR RI, as quoted on the DPR RI website, told the press at that time that it was

¹⁸ Idris, Muhammad. (2018, May 13). *DPR Minta Koordinasi Antar 'Intel' Diperkuat untuk Atasi Teroris*. [DPR asks for coordination between 'Intel' to be strengthened to deal with terrorists.] Accessed on February 10, 2024, from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4018694/dpr-minta-koordinat-antar-intel-diperkuat-untuk-atasi-teroris> .

very urgent to strengthen the intelligence base to eradicate terrorism in the country. He stated that with strong intelligence, actions to eradicate terrorism could be more focused and effective. In his statement he also emphasized that attacking actions without prior intelligence data actually expanded and did not solve the problem. Intelligence units, especially in strengthening the quality of intelligence information, really need to be involved.¹⁹

In line with what happened in 2018, the bomb attack in Makassar in 2021 did not reduce public pressure on the weak coordination between various existing intelligence agencies in countering terrorism. The strong criticism that has developed emphasizes the still weak effectiveness of coordination between related institutions amidst the increasing budget provided by the state. Chairman of the MPR RI (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia/Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly), Hidayat Nur Wahid, strongly criticized the performance of BIN and BNPT in preventing terrorism amidst the outpouring of funds that had been provided.²⁰

What is interesting is that the growing criticism also continues to target the weak coordination between BNPT and BIN. Former Head of BAIS TNI, Soleman Ponto criticized the performance of BNPT which was considered slow in responding to intelligence information provided to the agency. If in previous terror acts, BIN was often blamed, BNPT is actually considered the institution most to blame for the bomb attack in Makassar in 2021.²¹

With the series of bombings that occurred in the 2016-2021 period, the author sees that the public's negative response to the intelligence function in countering terrorism has become an external force, in line with the Weiss concept, in encouraging BNPT's efforts to coordinate intelligence functions related to countering terrorism. Especially in 2021, the growing public response

¹⁹ DPR. (2018, May 17). *Perkuat Intelijen Sebelum Berantas Terorisme*. [Strengthen Intelligence Before Eradicating Terrorism.] Retrieved February 10, 2024, from <https://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/20782/t/Perkuat%20Intelijen%20Sebelum%20Berantas%20Terrorism>

²⁰ Nuralam, Candra Yuri (2021, March 29). *Wakil Ketua MPR Sentil BNPT dan BIN Usai Bom Meledak di Makassar*. [Deputy Chairman of the MPR Sentil BNPT and BIN After the Bomb Exploded in Makassar.] Accessed on February 10, 2024, from <https://www.medcom.id/nasional/Hukum/8N0j1Gak-bangun-ketua-mpr-sentil-bnpt-dan-bin-usai-bom-meledak-di-makassar>

²¹ Dialeksis. (2021, April 4). *Mantan Kabais Sebut Banyak Teror Di Indonesia Salah BNPT, Bukan Intelijen*. [Former Kabais Says Much of the Terror in Indonesia is BNPT's Fault, Not Intelligence.] Accessed on February 10, 2024, from <https://www.dialeksis.com/Berita/mantan-kabais-buat-besar-teror-di-indonesia-saya-bnpt-bukan-intelijen/index.php>

also highlights the performance of BNPT which is considered weak in responding to intelligence reports. This of course indirectly increases the pressure on BNPT to strengthen the coordination function it carries out, especially in relation to collaborating with intelligence agents in countering terrorism.

Conclusion

From the analytical presentation that has been presented, it can be seen how the two important factors put forward by Weiss, namely growing public pressure and efforts to equalize perceptions, can be considered as important aspects in encouraging cooperation between various intelligence agencies. A series of bomb terror attacks in Indonesia, especially in the 2016-2021 period, basically reinforced the discourse regarding the importance of cooperation between various intelligence agents in institutions involved in countering terrorism.

The polemic regarding demands for BIN's enforcement authority in terrorism matters has also strengthened public opinion regarding the importance of collaboration as a key aspect in handling terrorism. In the theory put forward by Weiss, this dynamic ultimately creates community pressure as an important part of the formation of institutional collaboration.

The author sees that the public pressure that emerged regarding the importance of coordination between institutions ultimately contributed to the steps taken by BNPT in seeking to form intelligence collaboration in overcoming terrorism. Since 2020, from the data obtained, it appears that BNPT has carried out a series of activities aimed at strengthening the common perception between various intelligence agencies in looking at the issue of terrorism.

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